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Measures for an emperor: 
Volusius Maecianus’ monetary pamphlet for Marcus Aurelius 
 
 
To the Greeks the Muse gave intellect  
and well-rounded speech; they are greedy only for praise.  
Roman children, with lengthy calculations, learn  
to divide the as into a hundred parts.1
 
Like many clichés, Horace’s sour depiction of Roman pragmatism has some truth 
to it – except that the Greeks were just as interested as the Romans in correctly dividing 
currency into parts. Metrology, the knowledge of measures of weight, length, volume, 
and of money, was a major presence in ancient education and ancient life. The 
excavations of the Athenian agora have turned up some two hundred metrological 
objects.2 A great many papyri from Hellenistic and Roman Egypt are accounts, bills, or 
contracts stipulating sizes or weights of things. Texts such as the so-called Athenian 
coinage decree3 or the bilingual tax decree from Palmyra4 are expressions of political and 
economic decisions variously translated into metrological policies.  
The act of measuring creates a correspondence between things in the real world 
and symbols, be they numbers, units of measurement, or signs representing numbers or 
                                                 
1 Horace, Ars Poetica (Letters 2.3), 323-6, mentioned in Dilke (1989) 50. Another locus classicus here is 
Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.4. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Lang & Crosby (1964). 
3 Meiggs & Lewis (1969), 45 (450-446 BC). See D. Lewis’s and H. Mattingly’s articles in Carradice 
(1987). 
4 Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum 2.3.3913 (AD 137, in Greek and Palmyrene). See Matthews (1984). 
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units of measurement. For instance, the Palmyra decree enforces a correspondence 
between, say, a sack of salt and two symbols: a number expressing its volume, expressed 
in terms of modii (units of measurement), and another number, tied by decree to the first 
one, expressing the tax tariff in terms of duty per modius. In the specific situation of the 
tax payment, the sack of salt ‘becomes’ its volume, that is, it exists in the form of a 
certain number – this translation is what makes the transaction possible. 
Metrological documents are ‘inscription devices’, in a sense of the term which I 
adapt from Bruno Latour’s work.5 They are technologies that provide a representation of 
reality such that the representation becomes a necessary medium for interacting with that 
reality, because it (the translation, the ‘something standing for something else’) makes 
reality more manageable and more orderly. Examples of inscription devices include maps 
and graphs. Maps today can be said to have substituted landmarks as a means for 
orientation – in the case of the London Underground map, for instance, the coloured lines 
intersecting each other on paper are, for its users, by all accounts much more real than the 
real world of tunnels that ‘are’ London, underground. And graphs expressing, for 
instance, the outcome of a complex biochemical experiment substitute recourse to the 
mass of data produced by the various stages of the experiment. Once the graph is 
accepted by the scientific community, the reality it stands for, the mass of data, will in 
practice be obliterated. Inscription devices then write down (inscribe) reality in such a 
way that from now on we shall look at the inscription rather than at the reality it is 
                                                 
5 Especially Latour (1987) 68-78. 
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supposed to represent. Indeed, according to Latour, the representation ends up ‘being’ the 
reality.  
In some contexts, once the device is in place, the process that produced it 
disappears, like scaffolding, to the point that reality is now seen as always having 
contained within itself the inscription or the representation, independently from the 
human agents that produced it in the first place. What originates as basically a matter of 
useful convention, of approximation, of educated guess, is transformed into a law of 
nature. In a metrological context, a sack of salt may ‘become’ a certain number of modii 
to such a deep extent that one talks of a ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ system of measures, as if 
the number of modii had somewhat been lurking within the apparently unordered mass of 
salt all along, waiting to be weighed and declared; just as Michelangelo’s statues were 
said by the artist to be imprisoned in their block of marble, waiting to be freed from the 
superfluous matter in order to reveal their true shape.  
Thus metrological documents can be a powerful tool to create a certain ‘natural’ 
order, and to make knowledge of certain taxonomies, relations and systems indispensable 
for correctly accessing reality. Both the Palmyra decree and the Athenian coinage decree 
are good examples of how metrologies – in particular metrologies having to do with 
money – serve as political instruments, and, given their extension of a certain order from 
a centre issuing the metrology over to a periphery, as instruments of empire.6
A thorough exploration of how these issues are articulated in the ancient world would 
warrant much more time and space than I have at present. Nevertheless, I shall attempt to 
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at least whet the reader’s appetite by focussing on one intriguing ancient metrological 
text, known in Latin as the Distributio item vocabula ac notae partium in rebus quae 
constant pondere numero mensura (Division, as well as terms and signs of the parts in 
things which are reckoned by weight, number and measure), which I shall henceforth 
refer to as the Distributio.7 Its author, Lucius Volusius Maecianus (AD 110?-166?) was a 
well-known and respected member of the Roman elite, widely appreciated for his 
expertise in the law. In addition to the Distributio, he wrote (as far as we know) sixteen 
books on legacies, fourteen books on criminal actions, and a treatise on the Rhodian law 
of the sea.8 We have several inscriptions relating to him, including a cursus honorum or 
account of his political career; we know that he was a patron of the corporation of 
ferrymen, auxiliaries and record-keepers; and that he was appointed to the post a libellis 
(in charge of juridical petitions and coordinating responses to them) in AD 138 under 
Hadrian, and to two posts in the imperial bureaucracy (a studiis and a bibliothecis) under 
Antoninus Pius in around 150.9 He taught law to Marcus Aurelius.10 Between AD 159 
and 161 he was prefect of Egypt; in charge of the corn supply in Rome by 161; a consul 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 See again Latour (1987) chapter 6. 
7 The main edition is by Hultsch (1866), vol. II vii, 17-22 and 61-71, also available in Seckel & Kübler 
(1908), 408-18, and based on Th. Mommsen’s text in Abhandlungen der sächsische Gesellschaft der 
Wissenschaften III (1857) 281-5 (non vidi).  
8 Rohden & Dessau (1898) 3.481-2; Seckel & Kübler (1908) 408; Casavola (1980) 328-32; Fanizza (1982) 
105; Kunkel (2001) 174-6. 
9 CIL 14.250=ILS 6174, found in a church wall at Ostia. See also Scriptores Historiae Augustae. Antoninus 
Pius 12.1. For similar examples of patronage of professional associations, see Clemente (1972); van Nijf 
(1997) 100-20. 
10 SHA. Marcus Antoninus 3.6. Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus referred to Maecianus as ’our friend‘ in 
a rescript (AD 161-9), Digesta 37.14.17. Marcus Aurelius also mentions Maecianus as someone close to 
him in a letter to Fronto, dated to between AD 140-143, now in M. Cornelius Fronto, Epistulae 1.74-8 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1919 – corresponding to 2.4 Naber). Marcus Aurelius, 
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in 166, the year in which, according to some interpretations, he died. According to others, 
however, he was killed in 175, during an uprising in Alexandria.11 It is abundantly clear 
from this that Maecianus’ vicinity to three emperors, culminating in what appears to have 
been a direct and close relationship with Marcus Aurelius, puts him in a privileged 
position to comment on issues of order and knowledge, as indeed he appears to do in his 
work. We shall return to these points presently. I shall begin by describing the contents of 
the Distributio, and then tackling some of the issues arising from it. 
  
I. The treatise 
The Distributio was written for Marcus Aurelius, probably in AD 146 when he was not 
yet emperor. Maecianus starts:  
I have often noticed, Caesar, that you are upset because you regard the subdivision of the 
as, which is necessary for inheritances and for many other things, as unknown. Thus, so 
that such a small thing does not impede your mind in any way, I have assessed how to set 
out both those parts and their names and signs. You can grasp then on the one hand the 
infinite subdivision of parts, on the other their utterly small names and signs.12
                                                                                                                                                 
Meditations 1.6, mentions a philosopher Marcianus that he resolves to listen to – the manuscript tradition is 
problematic, and some scholars think that Marcianus could be emended to Maecianus. 
11 A Maecianus is mentioned as having been killed by the army after conspiring against Marcus Aurelius in 
SHA. Marcus Antoninus 25.6 and SHA. Avidius Cassius 7.4, but not all scholars agree that he is the same as 
the jurist. For a death around AD 166, see Fanizza (1982) 114.  
12 Distributio 61.12-9: Saepenumero, Caesar, animadverti aegre ferentem te, quod assis distributionem et 
in heredum institutione et in aliis multis necessariam ignotam haberes. Quare ne tam exigua res ingenium 
tuum ullo modo moraretur, cum partes ipsas tum vocabula et notas proponendas existimavi; et 
deprehendes distributionem quidem partium infinitam, oppido autem quam exigua vocabula et notas. 
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The tone is familiar, and there is an assumption that Marcus Aurelius is aware of 
Maecianus’ other field of expertise (inheritance law), which is here hinted at, as if to 
bolster his credentials.13 One of the main themes of the treatise is introduced: the 
relationship between various parts of the as (the piece of money), and their number and 
name and sign, small things that, amazingly, pin down the infinite. 
Maecianus starts with the subdivision of the coin known as the solidus, also called 
libra or as. The three alternative nomenclatures are the prelude to a systematic taxonomy, 
where each part of the as is introduced in turn as a numerical fraction, a name (the 
formula is ‘it is called’ (vocatur) or ‘its name is’ (nomen est))14 and a sign (‘its sign is’ 
(cuius nota)).15 The as is subdivided into halves (semisses), thirds (trientes), fourths 
(quadrantes), sixths (sextantes), eighths (sescunciae), ninths (unciae duae sextulae) and 
twelfths (unciae) – the “elements, as it were’ of the first division (distributio). Maecianus 
perhaps alludes here to Euclid’s Elements, and hence to the fundamental, seminal nature 
of his present work. These elements, he says, ‘preserve equality’,16 unless they are added 
or subtracted to each other, in which case they sometimes produce equal, sometimes 
unequal parts. For example, if you add a sextans to a quadrans, you obtain a quincunx, 
equivalent to five unciae, i.e. 5/12; or, if you add a semis to a sextans, you obtain a bes, 
                                                 
13 Fanizza (1982) sees a link between the Distributio and Maecianus’ work on fideicommissa (15), and 
between the Distributio and Maecianus’ post as praefectus annonae (112). Indeed, Digesta 35.2.32.4 
(Maecianus from book 9 of the Fideicommissa, commenting on the lex Falcidia) contemplates a 
proportional contribution on the part of heir and recipient of legacy, in case they owe money as a result of a 
case involving the deceased. According to Vindius noster, the contribution should be proportional to their 
respective inheritances. Maecianus finds this idea both fair and logical (aequitatem et rationem […] habet). 
14 On the importance of names for measures, see Heilbron (1990) 207-42, especially 214-5.  
15 In Pliny the Elder’s discussion of Roman coinage, nota is the design on the coin – see Historia naturalis 
33.44-6. 
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i.e. 8/12.17 Those are unequal parts. In general, the subdivisions of the as can be equal – a 
certain multiple of each subpart produces a whole as; for instance, six sextantes make an 
as, and so do two semisses, three trientes, and so on - or unequal. No multiple of a 
quincunx can produce a whole as – two will fall short of an as by a sextans, three will 
exceed an as by a triens.  
The two parallel subdivisions are distinguished also by the fact that equal parts 
can only be characterized in one way, whereas unequal parts have several alternative 
definitions. For instance, a semis is, simply, one half, 1/2, and is obtained by dividing the 
as into two. A bes, on the other hand, can be obtained by adding 1/12 to 7/12, or by 
adding 1/2 to 1/6, or 5/12 to 1/4, or 1/3 to 1/3, and can be defined as eight unciae or four 
sextants or two trientes or even an as minus a third.18 Even though unequal parts have a 
non-univocal nomenclature, and are characterized in a multiplicity of ways, their 
distinctive ‘signs’ (notae) remain the same. A bes, no matter how defined in terms of 
addition or multiplication of parts, is denoted by S =. The  ‘signs’ of the unequal parts are 
in fact loaned from those of the equal ones: the sign of the bes reveals, and possibly 
privileges, one of its possible origins as the sum of a semis (denoted by S) and a sextans 
(denoted by =).  
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Distributio 62.13-5: Haec velut elementa primae de asse distributionis aequalitatem servant. 
17 Ibid. 62.15-8 and 22-4, respectively. 
18 Ibid. 62.22-4; 63.28-31. 
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After the as, Maecianus moves to a ‘less known, but not totally obscure’, 
monetary sphere: that of the uncia or ‘twelfth of an as’,19 which is posited as the mid-
point between a tree of subdivisions upwards, towards the as, and an open-ended 
subdivision tree downwards, into ever smaller parts. The first subdivision of the uncia is 
along similar lines to that of the as: into halves (semunciae), thirds (binae sextulae), 
fourths (sicilici), sixths (sextulae), twelfths (dimidiae sextulae) and twenty-fourths 
(scriptula, also called scripula). In each case, as with the parts of the as, we are told what 
part of the uncia the unit is, what it is called and what its denoting sign is.20  
The apparently easy symmetry, however, is immediately shattered, as Maecianus 
points out the complete arbitrariness of his own systematization. ‘These parts’ he says, 
‘can be further divided into however many parts you want, but below them you do not 
find signs or proper names apart from those’.21 The reason why some subdivisions have 
signs and names and others do not, is simply not given: Maecianus observes that, for 
instance, the as could be divided into eleven equal parts, but it is not. There are no name 
and no sign for elevenths or tenths, the way there are for ninths or sixths. In other words, 
the relationship between thing and name and symbol, which had seemed rather 
straightforward in the first subdivision and had acquired multiplicity in the second 
subdivision, has now been exploded – there are things that, although at some level they 
exist for us, do not have a name or a distinctive sign, unless they serve specific 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 64.12-7. 
20 Ibid. 64.18-28. 
21 Ibid. 65.13-5: Has quoque partes in quantum libet dividere possis; verum infra eas neque notas neque 
propria vocabula invenies praeter ea. 
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purposes.22 Thus ‘some accountants call the half scriptulum a simplium’, or again a one-
per-cent interest rate is endowed with a specific name.23
From mentioning interest and capital, the account moves on to a sort of interlude. 
Maecianus comments: ‘The nomenclature of the as has to do with concrete things and 
bequests taken as a whole, while its division has to do with a description of the parts; it 
can also be applied to numbered wealth (pecunia numerata), which used to be in bronze, 
later started to be struck in silver, so that each silver coin had value depending on the 
quantity of bronze [it amounted to]’.24 A historical dimension is thus introduced.25 For 
instance, Maecianus says that the libella, i.e. a tenth of a denarius, used to have the same 
function as the as, but is now associated with the past and the ways of the ancients 
(exemplo maiorum).26 The victoriatus was once a foreign coin, ‘as tetradrachma and 
drachma are today’: originally from Illyria and Thessaly, it started to be issued in Rome 
between the First and the Second Punic Wars, and gradually assimilated into ‘normal’ 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 65.19-66.14. Similar questions arise in contemporary literature (Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 2.26, 
on how there are more colours than there are names for them in either Greek or Latin) and jurisprudence 
(Neratius in Digesta 22.6.2 posits a contrast between the determinacy of law and the indeterminacy of facts 
subsumed under it, see discussion in Scarano Ussani (1979), 5-77). 
23 Distributio 65.15-6 Dimidium scriptulum audio quosdam ratiocinatores simplium vocare) and 66.14-5, 
respectively. 
24 Ibid. 66.21-6: Sicut autem assis appellatio ad rerum solidarum hereditatisque totius, divisio autem eius 
ad partium demonstrationem pertinet, ita etiam ad pecuniam numeratam refertur, quae olim in aere erat, 
postea in argento feriri coepit ita, ut omnis nummus argenteus ex numero aeris potestatem haberet. I have 
translated aes throughout as ‘bronze’ for convenience, but in fact it could indifferently denote bronze or 
copper. 
25 Temporal adverbs abound; the Greeks and the Twelve Tables are mentioned at Distributio 67.5-9. Aulus 
Gellius, Noctes Atticae 20.1 features a discussion of the laws of the Twelve Tables, revolving around the 
changing value of the as: when the Tables were written, it was a remarkable sum, but no longer so in the 
second century AD. This sparks off the debate whether the ancestral laws were excessively cruel and are 
now outmoded. Historical awareness was a fundamental component of jurisprudence, see e.g. Casavola 
(1980) 9-12; Bretone (1982) 10. 
26 Distributio 70.16-30. 
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currency.27 The parallels between appropriation of the coin and gradual incorporation of 
Illyria within the Roman state (effective by the early first century AD), sanctioned by the 
appropriation of the image of Victory, which gives the coin its name, are obvious.  
Having gestured towards the potential infinity of micro-units lurking beneath the 
as and uncia, a whirlpool of nameless bits of money, a ’here be monsters’ on the map of 
currency that he is drawing, and after the historical interlude, Maecianus continues his 
deliberate ordering. He launches into subdivisions of larger denominations, the denarius 
and the sestertius; the accounts are punctuated by direct appeals to the reader to denote 
each part with its sign and name.28 The author declines to go into the subdivisions of the 
victoriatus or the quinarius because he does not know the Roman way of proceeding; he 
says, however, that the reader can work it out by analogy with other monetary units.29  
Finally, Maecianus turns to weight, liquid and grain measures, which are 
organized along lines similar to money. In fact, units for weight and for money often 
share names and values, because at least in origin each coin was denoted by its weight. 
This relation was loosened and partly broken down when financial circumstances 
required devaluation of the currency. 
The conclusion is tantalizingly fragmentary: ‘The natural cause of the parts and of 
number remains unchanged, however much they may differ in name with each nation. 
The size of weights and measures is unstable, because its weighing and measuring 
                                                 
27 Distributio 66.29-67.2: Victoriatus enim nunc tantundem valet quantum quinarius; olim ut peregrinus 
nummus loco mercis, ut nunc tetradrachmum et drachma, habebatur. Cf. Mattingly (1928) 13-7. 
28 Distributio 67.12-68.24, e.g. 67.14-5, 17-8, 19-20, passim. 
29 Distributio 69.1-6 (Ad quinarium et victoriatum rationem Romae confici nescio). 
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out…’30. It would seem that Maecianus was commenting, perhaps as a conclusion to his 
survey, on the complex relationship between the thing and its stand-ins (number that 
expresses its measure, coin that expresses its value and is also represented by a number, 
sign that denotes the coin that expresses the value of a certain quantity of a thing), and on 
the permanence and variability of these various classifications and correspondences - 
issues that have already emerged at several points in the text. 
Using a coin is ultimately an act of trust in the correspondence established 
between the piece of metal and the thing one wants to buy, a correspondence represented 
by an equivalence of value between the price of the merchandise and the amount the coin 
is worth.31 Money is in fact the prime example of a metrological object which has turned 
from representation of reality into reality – an inscription device where the signs meant to 
depict a thing are now taken as the thing itself. The Latin word for ‘money’, pecunia, is 
semantically multi-layered: fundamentally, and originally, it denotes sheep; it also comes 
to signify wealth in general, because those who owned a large number of sheep were 
wealthy; and hence also money, the translation of a certain number of sheep into a 
quantity of metal which can travel and be stored and exchanged in a way that sheep 
cannot. Money is quantified value, sheep or other bodies that have become a number: 
                                                 
30 Distributio 71.23-6: Partium et numeri naturalis causa durat, quamvis nominibus apud quasque gentes 
different. Ponderis et mensurarum modus incertus est; nam eius dispensio ac dimensio… 
31 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica ad Nicomachum 1133a20-b15.. For assessments of the cultural and political 
background to classical Greek monetary economies, see von Reden (1997); Kurke (1999); Seaford (2004) 
(non vidi). 
 12
pecunia numerata, or ‘reckoned pecunia’.32 Of course the sheep are no longer important 
– what used to stand in for the object of value is now the object itself. In fact, money now 
signifies on the basis of other money rather than of things outside: the value of coins is 
expressed in terms of other coins, their universe of reference is self-contained and 
independent of its original meaning. 
The story of Rome could be narrated as that of the changing relations between 
things and the inscription devices which stand in for them: a metrological story.33 It is in 
parallel with the development of the empire, the accumulation of riches and various 
devaluations, regulations and deregulations, that pecunia, the substance for which coins 
stand in, becomes ‘reckoned’ (numerata) – it becomes inscribed and entangled in an 
intricate network of correspondences. The network pictured in Maecianus’ short treatise 
is revealing of wider webs and ramifications, and it gives rise to several questions. How 
does the Distributio relate to contemporary metrological literature? How does it relate to 
jurisprudence, which was Maecianus’ main field of expertise? And, finally, why should 
the emperor know about the subdivisions of the as? 
 
II. The treatise in a metrological context 
In many respects, the Distributio is quite uniquein ancient metrology. The closest 
comparable account is a passage from the fifth book of Varro’s On the Latin Language 
                                                 
32 Digesta 50.16.178 (Ulpian): ‘The word pecunia consists of not only counted money (pecunia numerata), 
but absolutely all money, that is, all bodies: for nobody will doubt that ‘bodies’ are included in the 
designation of money’. 
33 See Nicolet (1991). 
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(47-45 BCE), where the author performs a sort of naming ceremony for all aspects of 
reality, including public offices and elements of religious ritual, bestowing Latin names 
upon them.34 One of the underlying issues is, on what basis is this naming operation 
performed: what makes a certain name go with a certain thing? The section on money 
(‘stamped (signata) pecunia’) starts rationally enough: as comes from aes, the metal it is 
made of; dupondius from its ‘double weights’ (duo pondera), and so on. But by the time 
we get to a hundred asses, the stable, almost natural, connection between thing and name 
breaks down: ‘ducenti (two hundred) and higher numbers which are made by analogy do 
not indicate asses any more than they do denarii or any other thing’.35 What this brings 
home, once again, is the ambiguous nature of money and of its relationship with reality. 
For Pliny the Elder, the creation of money is just another of the crimes committed 
in the name of greed. In the section of his Natural History (published in CE 77) devoted 
to precious metals, he tells us that initially the Romans used raw metal, then king Servius 
introduced stamped bronze, and then ‘stamped silver’ (argentum signatum) came after 
the victory over king Pyrrhus. Pliny points out the original relation between coins and 
‘stuff’, reminding the reader of some weight-linked etymology: ‘expenditure’ derives 
from expensa, sums weighed out, and pecunia from the design stamped on the metal, 
which was an ox or a sheep.36 Whereas Varro’s order is, one could say, linguistic, trying 
to show that the relation between name and thing has a rationale, and Maecianus’ account 
                                                 
34 Varro, De lingua latina 5.36 (169-74), excerpted in Hultsch (1866) II 49-51. Unsurprisingly, given the 
time gap between them, Varro’s and Maecianus’ subdivisions overlap but do not coincide. 
35 Varro, op. cit. 5.170, Engl. tr. R.G. Kent with my modifications (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 1951).  
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is anchored to simple arithmetic, Pliny’s monetary map is shaped like a historical and 
moral narrative, where the explanation of various currency values, signs, and names, is to 
be found in the circumstances of Roman history, down to the present.37 Take this 
passage: ‘Next according to a law of Papirius asses of half an ounce were made. When 
Livius Drusus was tribune of the plebs he mixed the silver with an eighth of bronze. The 
coin now called victoriatus was struck under the Clodian law; but previously this coin 
imported from Illyria was used as an article of trade. It is in fact stamped with a Victory, 
hence the name’.38 The value and composition of coins are often changed by deed of 
Roman officers – the stability of the original relation between ‘real’ thing and monetary 
value, in its turn signified by the stable relation between the name of the coin and its 
composition or weight, both grow weaker with time, and are more and more subject to 
the vicissitudes and even whims of power. ‘The emperors gradually made the gold 
denarius smaller, and most recently Nero had forty-five denarii stamped from a pound of 
gold’.39  
The third ‘metrological’ work I shall discuss is Columella’s On agriculture. 
While he does not talk about currency specifically, Columella discusses measures of 
land; his work begs comparison with Varro’s treatise on the same subject, both being 
repositories of useful knowledge and at the same time of ethical guidelines for the estate-
owning members of the upper orders. Showing an attitude quite at odds with Maecianus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Pliny the Elder, Historia naturalis 33.42-45. Crawford (1985) 19-20; Burnett (1987) 15, and Savio 
(2001) 109-10 think Pliny’s testimony is not to be taken literally. 
37 Pliny the Elder, Historia naturalis  33.44-7. 
38 Pliny the Elder, op. cit. 33.46, my translation.  
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Columella states that metrological matters do not really pertain to him, but are rather the 
job of surveyors. He compares his role as a farmer to that of an architect, who plans the 
building project, but delegates measuring and cost-calculating to other people. 
Nevertheless, he proceeds to provide a discussion of measurements for the benefit of his 
reader and friend Silvinus – even architects, after all, have to be acquainted with the 
‘account of measurements’ (ratio mensurarum).40 Columella thus lists units of land 
measurement, drawing on Varro on a couple of occasions, and, like Varro, occasionally 
providing etymologies and local variations in nomenclature and subdivisions. In a 
manner analogous to that of Varro’s piece on money, the temporal dimension sneaks in, 
as a factor that loosens the relation between thing and ‘stand-in’ for the thing: 
“‘[F]ormerly the centuria was so called because it contained 100 iugera [approximately 
2/3 of an acre], but afterwards when it was doubled it retained the same name, just as the 
tribes were so called because the people were divided into three parts but now, though 
many times more numerous, still keep their old name’.41  
After a further disclaimer, in which Columella says that the smaller fractions of 
the iugerum are superfluous because no transaction depends on them, he goes on to list 
subdivisions of the iugerum anyway, from its smallest fraction, the half-scripulum, to the 
iugerum itself, which is explicitly compared to an as.42 The next section applies these 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 Pliny the Elder, op. cit. 33.47, my translation. 
40 Columella, De agricultura 5.1.2-4. Engl. tr. E. Heffner (London/Cambridge, MA: Heinemann & 
Harvard University Press 1954). 
41 Columella, op. cit. 5.1.7,  
42 Columella, op. cit. 5.1.8-12. 
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measurements to pieces of land of different shape, used as formulae.43 In other words, a 
further level is inserted between thing and measure: the geometrical representation of a 
field. A piece of land becomes a geometrical figure, becomes a certain quantity of iugera; 
and from there it can come to represent a certain quantity of any other units of 
measurement, even non-Roman ones, even those no longer in use, provided one can 
establish a relation between those and the iugera. The well-established, solidified, 
inscription device allows connections and comparability across time and space. 
The surveyors Columella refers to often feel it necessary to impart some 
metrological knowledge onto the readers of their treatises. The authors in the collection 
we now call the ‘Roman field-surveyors’ (Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum) 
frequently and explicitly equate measure and order in a wider political sense, and their 
closeness to the centres of power can be argued from their biography, as in the case of 
Frontinus, or from their own statements, as in the case of Balbus. The job of the surveyor 
consisted to a great extent in negotiating the metrology of a territory: converting un-
measured pieces of land into measured ones, converting non-Roman or pre-Roman 
measures into Roman ones, or juxtaposing them to Roman ones, and making sure that the 
relation between measure and thing remained stable through the use of boundary stones, 
indeed making it stable by producing maps.44  
                                                 
43 Columella, op. cit. 5.1.13-2.10. 
44 E.g. Frontinus, De limitibus 10.16-25 (ed. and Engl. tr. Campbell (2000)); Hyginus 1, De condicionibus 
agrorum 88.22-90.9 (Campbell); Hyginus 2, Constitutio limitum 136.28-38 (Campbell); Balbus, Expositio 
et ratio omnium formarum 204.19(Campbell); Deformatio 240.15-22 (Campbell); De mensuris agrorum 
270.10-34 (Campbell); De agris 272.22-5 (Campbell); Marcus Nipsus, Podismus 296.4-26 (eds. F. Blume, 
K. Lachmann, A. Rudorff, Gromatici veteres, Berlin: Reimer 1848-52); Mensurarum genera 339.1-340.8 
(Blume); De mensuris 371.1-376.13 (Blume); [Boethius], Demonstratio artis geometricae 407.1-408.2 
(Blume). De mensuris agrorum, Mensurarum genera, De mensuris and the pseudo-Boethius would warrant 
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A Roman surveyor from probably the first century AD states that official 
measurements should be given both in Roman and in local units. But ‘if there was a 
dispute whether a versus [a Dalmatian unit of measurement] had 8,640 feet, confidence 
(fides) could nevertheless be placed in the iugera. [...] When the iugera have been 
recorded, even if something can be <done> using local terminology, a system involving 
iugera will be inherently reliable for us’.45 The desire for stability and systematization of 
measures unsurprisingly tends to privilege Roman standards, but is compounded with the 
recognition of local realities and local networks of consensus: ‘[e]ach region follows its 
own practice so that a trustworthy method can be agreed upon’.46 In general, ‘[w]e must 
watch out <for the practices of> different regions in case we seem to be doing something 
unusual. For our profession will retain its integrity if we also conduct our investigations 
principally according to the practice of the region’.47  
Sometimes the similarities with Maecianus’ small treatise are striking, for 
example when Siculus Flaccus talks about subdivision of the main Roman unit of 
measurement for land areas: ‘Centuriae do not contain 200 iugera in all regions. For in 
some we find 210, in others 240. So this matter also will have to be carefully examined, 
since it follows that limites will not be of an equal length between the boundary stones if 
                                                                                                                                                 
further study, but, given their late date, not as part of this paper. All quotations from Campbell’s edition 
reproduce his translation. For Frontinus, see A. Weeks’s paper in this volume. 
45 Hyginus 1, De condicionibus agrorum 88.23-90.12, especially 88.25-32. Cf. also ibid. 96.23-24 
(Campbell). 
46 Hyginus 1, De generibus controversiarum 92.24-25. See also Ordines finitionum. Latinus et Mysrontius 
togati Augustorum auctores. De locis suburbanis vel diversis itineribus pergentium in suas regiones 
254.13: “In many lands trust (fides) is required in different markers” (Campbell). 
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centuriae have more than 200 iugera. For example, if a centuria has 240 iugera, it 
follows that there will be 24 actus from stone to stone along one limes, […] and 20 actus 
along the other. […] I have discovered that in some lands that had been divided, although 
the centuriae contained 200 iugera, they had not been given equal lengths of 20 actus 
between the marker stones, along the limites. In the territory of Beneventum there are 25 
actus along the decumani, and 16 along the kardines. Nevertheless, 200 iugera are 
enclosed by this type of measurement, but square centuriae are not thereby produced’.48 
As in the case of the as, there can be various subdivisions, and they can be related to the 
passage of time or political events in certain regions: the surveyor, the administrator and, 
by extension, the emperor have to be aware of these fluctuations in the relations between 
things and measures. 
Balbus’ treatise The description and account for all shapes (Expositio et ratio 
omnium formarum) is again a foil to the Distributio. Its declared aim is to set out the 
basics of the surveying profession, starting from measurements, i.e. ‘anything that is 
defined by weight, capacity or by judgement’, although Balbus is thinking essentially of 
measures of length.49 He proceeds to expound the twelve names of the measurements in 
use, and some of their subdivisions: for instance, a sextans, also called dodrans, 
encompasses three palmi, nine unciae and twelve digiti. The objects of Balbus’ account 
start in a two-dimensional world, as it were, and expand into further dimensions: the 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Hyginus 1, De generibus controversiarum 94.25-27. Cf. also Siculus Flaccus, De condicionibus agrorum 
104.34-106.13, 17-18, 108.20-21, 26-27, 114.34; Agennius Urbicus, De controversiis agrorum 20.16-21, 
30.31-33, 34.19-21, 36.11-12, 40.4-6, 42.10-13 (Campbell). 
48 Siculus Flaccus, De condicionibus agrorum 126.6-17 (Campbell). 
49 Balbus, Expositio 206.5-6 (Campbell). 
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‘concave square foot’ (pes quadratus concavus), for instance, ‘has the capacity of an 
amphora of three modii’.50 In fact, it is when explaining this expansion that he invokes 
the real world behind the intricate web of names, equivalences and subdivisions: 
‘Measurements are taken in three ways, by length, by breadth, and by height. That is, a 
straight line, a plane figure, and a solid figure. A straight (line) is where we measure the 
length without the breadth, for example, lines, porticos, running-tracks, length in miles, 
the length of rivers, and similar things. A plane (planum) is what the Greeks call 
epipedon; we refer to ‘level feet’ (pedes constrati)’.51 A correspondence is established 
between a thing (a river), the geometrical representation of that thing (a straight line) and 
what we call that representation (the name of the measurement, in Latin or Greek). 
Whereas we cannot really manipulate the real thing at will, we can operate on its 
representations, especially on the measurement, which can be further ordered according 
to divisions and correspondences. This aspect becomes crucial in the ‘taming’ of wild 
territories, which are subsumed, if only in an imperfect and approximate way, under a 
geometrical representation – are inscribed in the various senses we have given this word 
– and thus domesticated and made part of the empire. 
Finally, we have archaeological and epigraphic evidence on the regulation of 
weights and measures.52 One of the duties of the official known as an aedile was to 
                                                 
50 Balbus, Expositio 206.8-27, in particular 27 (Campbell). 
51 Balbus, Expositio 206.34-7 (Campbell). 
52 A further category of metrological texts is papyri dealing with units of measurement, including monetary 
units. E.g. PSI 763 (first century BC, provenance unknown); P. Lond. 2.265 (first century AD, ed. F.G. 
Kenyon, London: British Museum Publications 1898); P. Oxy. 9 verso, 669, 3455-3460 (ranging from the 
first to the fourth century AD); P. Ryl. 64, 538 (second to fourth century AD); P. Vindob. G 26012 (third to 
fourth century AD) in Sijpesteijn (1980). See also Boyaval (1971) and Pintaudi & Sijpestijn (1989), 114-5, 
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inspect weights and measures in use in a market to prevent frauds, and it is well known 
that officially approved weights and measures had to be used in cities across the Empire: 
this is testified by archaeological finds of measuring tables (mensae ponderariae) in 
many marketplaces,53 by inscriptions54 and by legal rescripts such as the following: ‘If a 
seller or a buyer tampers with the publicly approved measures of wine, corn, or any other 
thing, or commits a deception with malicious intent, he is sentenced to a fine of double 
the value of the thing concerned; and it was laid down by decree of the deified Hadrian 
that those who had falsified weights or measures should be relegated to an island’.55  
 
In sum, the Distributio can be seen against a wider background of metrological 
texts and indeed objects: it is part of a strong interest in standardisation, which I take to 
                                                                                                                                                 
relative to Ammonios’ notebook, Louvre MNE 911, probably sixth-century. The Distributio often shares 
with them a didactic approach, the familiar tone, the frequent direct appeals to the reader in the second 
person singular, the exhortations to ‘say’ or ‘write’, as a sort of exercise after the author has shown the 
reader how to do something. Interestingly, some of the techniques of subdivision found in the Distributio 
had been in use since ancient Egyptian times. As is well known, Egyptian arithmetic used parts (what we 
would today call fractions) of the type 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 and so on, the only exception being 2/3. This also meant 
that each part which was not 2/3 and did not have one as a denominator had to be expressed in terms of the 
sum of ‘recognized’ fractions. For instance, 3/5 was denoted by 1/2 plus 1/10, but could also be denoted by 
1/5 plus 1/5 plus 1/5. As in the case of Maecianus’ ‘unequal’ subdivision of the as, there were several 
alternative sequences for each fraction, some of which seem to have been preferred to others. Part of the 
calculator’s skill, and thus of the training he received, consisted in doing these sums and in choosing from 
among the many alternatives the one best suited to the purpose, see Gillings (1972) 45-50; Harrauer & 
Sijpesteijn (1985) 151-64.  
53 See Frayn (1993) 108-14, 123; Corti (2001), both with further references. Particularly interesting is the 
mensa ponderaria from Pompeii (CIL 10.793), which is inscribed with Latin indications of measures and 
weights but still shows traces of the previous, Oscan, measures, which have been erased. 
54 E.g. CIL 9.2854 (from Histonium in Puglia, no date given); CIL 10.6017 (Minturno, ca. AD 40); CIL 
11.6375 (Pesaro, no date given) – all three refer to the supervision of metrological standards in terms of 
aequitas. For an example from the Greek world cf. IG 5.1.1156 (from Gythium in Laconia, second century 
AD). 
55 Modestinus (third century AD) in Digesta 48.10.32, Engl. tr. ed. by A. Watson (Philadelphia PN: 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1985). See also Paul (early third century AD) in Digesta 4.3.3 and Ulpian 
(early third century AD) in Digesta 19.1.32, on using false weights. 
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mean establishing a stable connection between thing and measure. Once a standard is set 
in place, the universe of inscription devices can be considered self-sufficient and self-
referential, reality with its messiness and disorder can be black-boxed, information can be 
effectively stored, communicated and transported. The process is not simple, and is never 
completely successful: it always appears to be the fruit of negotiations between Rome’s 
present and her eventful past, and between the different cultures present within the 
empire and the allegedly dominant one. 
 
III. The treatise in a legal context 
Another interesting context for the Distributio is offered by contemporary legal 
literature. Hadrian and Antoninus Pius gave great importance to overhauling the 
bureaucracy, and reorganizing jurisprudence. Maecianus’ experience both as 
administrator and as jurist puts him in a privileged position as observer and participant in 
this process. Unfortunately, his own contributions to the law are no longer extant in their 
original form, having been selected and collected in Justinian’s Digest.56 Some fragments 
are, however, rather revealing. In one of them, Maecianus refers to the rationale (ratio) 
underlying a decision: ‘Slaves who are pre-adolescent are excepted […]. But the legate 
Trebius Germanus ordered even a pre-adolescent to be executed, and yet not without 
reason’. This has been seen as an appeal to the common ‘principle’ or even ‘rationality’ 
at the basis of law and administration, which is held to be more cogent than rules 
                                                 
56 See e.g. Digesta 29.5.14; 32.9; 32.11.2; 32.11.15; 32.13; 32.15; 32.17; 35.1.86; 35.1.91; 35.2.28; 
35.2.30; 35.2.32; 37.14.17; 40.5.42.  
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explicitly laid down.57 Again, Maecianus wrote on the lex Falcidia, which granted free 
power to dispose by bequest of up to three quarters of one’s substance, thus: ‘Suppose 
that Titus’s share is reduced in a legacy of twenty through the Falcidian law, Titius 
himself being charged to give five to Seius; […] a proportional reduction is to be made in 
Seius’s five comparable to that in Titius’s twenty. This decision is both more just and 
more reasonable’.58 A slightly different approach is revealed in another fragment, on the 
Rhodian law of jettison: ‘Volusius Maecianus, From the Rhodian Law: Petition of 
Eudaemon of Nicomedia to the Emperor Antoninus: “Antoninus, King and Lord, we 
were shipwrecked in Icaria and robbed by the people of the Cyclades”. Antoninus replied 
to Eudaemon: “I am master of the world, but the law of the sea must be judged by the sea 
law of the Rhodians where our own law does not conflict with it”’.59 Finally, on the topic 
of money, Maecianus, again commenting on the Falcidian law, deals with the 
complications of legacies and bequests in cases where a bequest has been specified in 
kind or in weight, number or measurement (as in, three talents of silver, rather than ‘the 
silver which I have in the warehouse’), and what happens when the goods become 
damaged before the heirs come into them. The question, indirectly, is again about the 
dialectic between pecunia, a valuable body, and counted (‘numerata’) pecunia : not just 
                                                 
57 Digesta 29.5.14, Engl. tr. cit., with modifications. See Fanizza (1982) 115-7. Scarano Ussani (1987) 34-
5, 114, sees a foreshadowing of Salvio Giuliano’s teachings, in their turn based on the notion of common 
interest and aimed at maintaining social and political order. 
58 Digesta 35.2.32, especially 4, Engl. tr. cit., with modifications.  
59 Digesta 14.2.9, Engl. tr. cit. The central passage can also be translated: ‘I am master of the world, but the 
law is mistress of the sea’, cf. Manfredini (1983). 
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‘coined’ money but (to stretch the sense) valuables that have been expressed ‘by weight, 
number and measuring’ (pondere numero mensura).60
Maecianus’ fragments encapsulate a number of questions that were being debated 
in second-century law. One is the ontological status of money, and how that affects 
everyday transactions. For example, Gaius considers the case of whether, in a sale, the 
price agreed must be in  counted money (pecunia numerata) or can be in other items, 
such as a slave, a piece of land or a toga. Gaius’ teachers thought that it could, because 
they thought that since time immemorial (and Homer is quoted in Greek to this effect) an 
exchange (permutatio) is a sale. The authorities of Proculus say, however, that exchange 
and sale are different: ‘In particular, they think it impossible in an exchange of goods to 
settle which thing has been sold and which given as price; they hold it absurd, again, that 
each thing be regarded as both sold and paid as the price’.61 The question, it seems to me, 
revolves around whether counted pecunia’ is the only stable way to effect a transaction. 
According to the second opinion, the lack of a measure throws the whole process into 
confusion. Pecunia by itself is disorderly and difficult to manage; its numerical stand-in 
has in a sense become more real than the real thing. But we should not forget that there 
are contrasting opinions here.  
A remarkable passage by Paul (late second to early third century CE) states the 
terms of the question even more explicitly: ‘Buying and selling started from exchange. 
Once in fact there was no coined money (nummus) and it did not happen that one thing 
                                                 
60 Digesta 35.2.30.3-5, from book 8 of Maecianus’ Fideicommissa. 
61 Gaius, Institutiones 3.141, Engl. tr. W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson (London: Duckworth 1988). 
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was called “wares” and the other “price” […] But since it did not always and easily 
happen that when you had something which I wanted, I, for my part, had something that 
you were willing to accept, a material was chosen, the official and permanent assessment 
of whose value would remedy the problems in exchanges thanks to the uniformity of 
quantity. That material, struck with an official figure, demonstrates its utility and 
dominion not so much on the basis of its substance as of its quantity, so that no longer are 
the things exchanged both called wares but one of them is termed the price’.62 The fact 
that money now has a value that depends not on its substance, but on a convention, 
ratified by the official figure struck on it, is the result of what we have called an 
inscription process. Pecunia numerata has almost become the reality by this time, and the 
jurists, including Maecianus, are engaged in reconstructing the genealogy of their present 
situation.  
In practice, a lot of the money that the Distributio discusses only existed in the 
form of signs and names. It has been observed that small units of currency would have 
been little used in antiquity because the as ‘would have been adequate for many of the 
purchases of everyday life’.63 A cursory look at what we know of actual prices from the 
Roman Empire reveals, in the East, figures of 1/24 of a denarius and 1/48 of a denarius 
for bread.64 The graffiti in Pompeii mention uncia and semiuncia, even though the 
                                                 
62 Digesta 18.1.1 (Paul, Edict 33), Engl. tr. cit. with modifications, italics mine. Paul continues with a 
discussion which is almost identical to the one in Gaius, Institutiones 3.141, and ends up siding with 
Proculus’ school. 
63 Howgego (1992) 19. 
64 Sperber (1974) 118-9. 
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context seems jocular,65 more frequently semisses66 and most frequently of all asses. 
Often there are numbers, or even itemized bills, with no indication of what unit is being 
referred to. A couple of inscriptions67 might have the symbol for scrupulus. There are 
also occurrences of what could be a sicilicus, and perhaps of quadrans. One could debate 
how representative these scattered testimonies are, and how tentative our reading of 
currency symbols, but overall there does seem to be a mismatch between the small 
bronze that may have been in circulation in antiquity and our finds of small bronze, a gap 
wider than in the case of silver and gold coinage. This is hardly surprising, if we consider 
that smaller coins are found as isolated and casual finds rather than as part of hoards. 
Their lesser value means that they would not have been treasured, and not actively sought 
if lost.68
Even providing for these accidents of survival, if one examines the distribution of 
Roman bronze coins in the Western Empire from AD 81 to AD 192, the presence of 
‘small bronze’ (anything smaller than asses, mostly quadrantes and a few semisses) is 
negligible. The quadrans has been found rather sporadically, more on Italian sites than in 
the northern provinces. The only surviving examples of semuncia, quartuncia, sextans, 
triens, quincunx, and bes coins date from the third or second century BC.69 Overall, the 
production of asses declines and that of sesterces increases from the first to the second 
                                                 
65 CIL 4.4227. 
66 E.g. CIL 4.8561, 4.8565, 4.8566, 4.8789, 4.8968 (in Greek with price in Latin). 
67 CIL 4.2029, 4.2030. 
68 Savio (2001) 160, 186. 
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century AD. By Trajan’s time, the smaller coins (nothing smaller than quadrantes in any 
case) may have disappeared because of inflation. In the Eastern coinage, there are more 
often smaller coins (obol and smaller, down to chalkos), but even then, at least in the case 
of Egypt, the frequency of the smaller bronze coins seems to decline from around the 
time of Hadrian.70 The obol seems to have been the smallest unit actually used in tax 
receipts and private accounts in Egypt, but there is also second-century evidence from 
Karanis that a very small unit, the dichalcon, was in use in tax receipts and ledgers, 
probably as an accounting device.71  
At least in the case of the subdivisions of the uncia Maecianus is therefore talking 
about ‘symbolic’, accountant money, used in calculations, not about ‘real’ money.72  
 
IV Money, measure and the emperor  
There is a practical aspect to measured wealth: if one agrees on standard weights 
or lengths, or at least on exchange systems, transactions and translations are made 
possible. Metrology allows control, a certain degree of order and centralisation. On the 
other hand, the significance of measures lies in the fact that they are symbols. Because 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 Mattingly (1928); Hobley (1998), esp. 12-4. For money units smaller than the as, see Crawford (1985), 
60-5; Burnett (1987) 95-7. On the problems of calculating coinage output, see Howgego (1992); Duncan-
Jones (1994) part III; Savio (2001) 50, 303-8. Also useful are Strack (1937); Sear (2000). 
70 West & Johnson (1967) 18-20.  
71 West & Johnson (1967) 17-8, 20-1. Rathbone (1991) 318-30 describes a system (Egypt, third century 
AD) which is basically monetised without necessarily using actual coins. 
72 Mrozek (2001) 9, 94-101 argues that the ‘abstractness’ of money was evident since at least late 
Republican times, because people invested and made debts, sometimes debts so huge that they could not 
possibly be paid back. A potentially infinite debt cannot correspond to actual, material, amounts of money. 
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the relation between things and their representation is not immediate or univocal, any 
decision concerning that relation is invested with a special authority,73 which can be 
religious and/or political. For instance, in the Middle Ages in parts of Europe measures of 
grain were established by the king, supported by his God-given power, and they acquired 
a sacred character; breaking them was akin to sacrilege.74 Alternatively, decisions about 
measures can be based on science, and justified as reflecting nature itself: Hyginus, a 
probably first-century AD land-surveyor, argued that the kardo and decumanus, two 
perpendicular lines which were the main reference points when laying out a land-division 
grid, were grounded in nothing less than the heavens and the ratio of the universe.75 Or 
again, expediency or utility can be invoked in the choice of one metrological network 
over another: this seems to have partly motivated Frontinus’ decision to use the quinaria 
as standard over the many other possibilities, because it was the best known, and its 
subdivisions the most accurate.76 The difference between recourse to utility and recourse 
to science is that the former tends to acknowledge the man-made, artificial or 
conventional aspect of the decision, which is presented as preferable given the 
circumstances, hence somewhat arbitrary, rather than as the most true or rational thing to 
do. 
                                                                                                                                                 
There was the idea, thanks to debit, interest and profit (faenus) that money, even when expressed in the 
language of money units, does not necessarily exist in the form of coins. 
73 See Kula (1986); Hocquet (1992); Porter (1995); Pedroni (1996); Grimaudo (1998); Ercolani Cocchi 
(2001). 
74 See Kula (1986). 
75 Hyginus 2, Constitutio limitum 134.5-6 (Campbell). This kind of position is very common in modern 
(post-1800) times: see e.g. Mirowski (1992); Alder (1995); Schaffer (1995). 
76 Frontinus, De aquis urbis Romae 1.26-37. See A. Weeks in this volume. 
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We can try to reconstruct what Maecianus may have thought on the issue. Perhaps 
his position was contained in the missing part of the treatise. In the extant text, he does 
not seem to take a stand on the question of whose authority is behind the money system 
he describes. He points out historical dimensions, the presence of economic interests, 
hints at local differences, but the fact that, for instance, the as is divided one way rather 
than another is not justified on the basis of nature or even of expediency: it is just given 
as a fact. Then again, Maecianus reveals the tentativeness of his arrangement at more 
than one point: the treatise is the result of his assessment or opinion (existimavi, 61.17), 
and his system is one of several possibilities. The particular order imposed on money 
may well be a convention, the result of a choice, a human decision. 
Analogous issues were being debated in the legal literature of the second century 
AD. The epistemic status of jurisprudence itself was questioned: was it ars or scientia? 
Consequently, could it aim at certainty, or was it bound to approximation; were its 
practitioners technical experts or did they have to derive their authority from their 
political clout? Crucially, what did the law rest on?77 Various possibilities were mooted. 
Tradition was one ground for justification, and one that seems to have been quite 
powerful in various areas of Roman culture, although it was far from being unquestioned, 
especially in the period we are talking about. The notion of ‘use value’ (utilitas), often 
invoked in extant decisions, was far from self-explanatory: the common good was not 
pellucid, but had to be determined by someone with some sort of authority. The existence 
of a rationality internal to the law, ultimately congruent with human rationality, and 
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reflecting, if imperfectly, the orderliness of the universe, was also a possibility. We have 
looked at Maecianus’ own mentions of ratio (reason, ‘rationale’). In fact, attempts to 
define a ratio for law (a ratio iuris), and to use it as an underlying, unifying principle 
have been traced in Roman jurists from at least Pomponius, a contemporary of 
Maecianus, to the third century CE. Especially in Gaius’ work, there is often a 
juxtaposition of two rationes, a natural one and a civic, political one, which ideally 
should work together.78 When that is not possible, it is suggested that nature should 
prevail.79 Celsus clearly states: ‘[Testaments] which are forbidden by nature are not 
endorsed by any law’.80 Underlying this distinction is the notion of a ‘law common to all 
peoples’ (ius gentium). Its identification with a sort of ‘natural law’ (ius naturale) is 
debatable, but, even if the  ‘law common to all peoples’ is the product of convention, then 
it is a more natural and universal convention than that at the basis of the ‘civil law’ (ius 
civile), which only binds a specific community.  
A good example of the debate is the case of the entitlements of the head of the 
household (pater familias). Jurists of the second and third centuries CE were very aware 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Casavola (1980) 54-7; Bretone (1982) 42-3, 268-70; Scarano Ussani (1987) 21-5 and (1997) parts 1 and 
3; Ducos (1994). 
78 As they do in Digesta 3.5.38, by Gaius (mid- to late second century AD). Cf. also Gaius, Institutiones 
1.1; 1.89; 2.66; Digesta 8.2.8; 9.4; 13.6.18.2; 41.1.3; 41.1.7.7; 44.7.1.9 (all mentioning naturalis ratio, all 
by Gaius). 
79 See e.g. Gaius, Institutiones 1.158, ratio civilis and civilia iura v. naturalia iura; Digesta 4.5.8, civilis 
ratio v. naturalia iura; Digesta 7.5.2, naturalis ratio v. the authority of the senate; Digesta 41.1.1, where 
the ius gentium, based on naturalis ratio, is declared older than the ius civile, “being the product of human 
nature itself.”, Engl. tr. cit. All the Digesta texts mentioned are by Gaius. 
80 Digesta 50.17.188.1, Engl. tr. cit., with modifications. Celsus also lived in the second century AD. See 
also Nocera (1962); Levy (1963); Stein (1974); Archi (1981); Scarano Ussani (1979) 198-9, 200-5 and 
(1987) 17-20; Bretone (1982) 32-3 and (1989), esp. 323-51; Ducos (1994) 5160-6. For contemporary 
discussions on whether words are the product of nature or convention, see e.g. Aulus Gellius, Noctes 
Atticae 10.4. 
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that the power exerted by the father in a Roman household was a peculiarity of Roman 
law, i.e. part of their ‘civil law’, but it was not found among other peoples, i.e. not in the 
‘law common to all peoples’, and thus arguably it was not based on nature. Its main 
strength was tradition, but in the course of the second century emperors like Hadrian 
seemed increasingly willing to put tradition on the side in the name of a different 
conception of what was legally the right thing to do. On the imperial scene, the sphere of 
application of any civil law to peoples other than the one that created it required some 
sort of justification: in metrological terms, in a situation where different units of measure 
exist, in order to establish a standard, appeal has to be made to something, be it 
practicality or the claim that the chosen standard is more rational or more natural than the 
others.  
In sum, I would argue that Maecianus’ approach to the subdivisions of money 
reflects contemporary legal debates. Jurists were concerned with the ambiguous nature of 
money; they, and Maecianus as one of them, reflect a situation where at least to some 
extent the link between thing and symbol has been problematised, weakened or even 
severed. Again, jurists were trying to put order in the law, and ground it firmly on a basis 
of nature, rationality or convention, creating standards, mapping out relations, cases and 
subcases; Maecianus was trying to do the same in the domain of money. In both cases, 
history and individual circumstances often got in the way; in both cases, the presence of a 
supreme authority loomed large in the background: the emperor. 
Where did the emperor stand in relation to the law: was he himself subject to it? 
The question had been discussed throughout the first century and seemed to be more or 
less settled in the second century AD, with the emperor emerging as the ultimate legal 
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expert.81 Complications remained, however, as showed by a deliberation process about 
the inheritance rights of patrons towards freedmen reported by Ulpian and involving 
Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, Maecianus himself and other jurist friends: ‘We […] 
followed this opinion (sententiam) when we dispatched a rescript in answer to the 
petition of Caesidia Longina; but likewise, our friend Volusius Maecianus, careful 
custodian of the civil law, apart from his long and well-grounded expertise in it, was 
induced by respect for our rescript to declare in our presence that he did not think he 
ought to say otherwise. But when we discussed the matter more fully with Maecianus 
himself and other legal experts also friends of ours, who had been summoned, it seemed 
rather that neither the words nor the meaning (sententia) of the law nor the praetor’s edict 
excluded the grandson from the property of his grandfather’s freedman; and that such 
was the view of several legal authorities too, but that it had also been the opinion 
(sententia) of our friend, the most honourable Salvius Julianus’.82  
Several factors are in play here: legal expertise on the part of various individuals, 
all reassuringly denoted as ‘ours’ (noster or nostri); the literal and not strictly literal 
interpretation of the law; the edict of a praetor who would have been a member of the 
Senate and possibly the representative of a political authority other than that of the 
emperor; the emperors’ own opinion. There has been some debate about Maecianus’ 
demeanour in this case: for some, he was being too subservient to the decision of the 
emperors, for others, he was just being professional, the perfect lawyer-bureaucrat with 
                                                 
81 Bretone (1989) 234-7. 
82 Digesta 37.14.17, Engl. tr. cit. with modifications. Cf. Bretone (1989) 219.  
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no political identity, since the imperial will was in fact legally binding.83 In any case, it is 
clear that behind the amicable appearances, ever since Augustus the emperor was the 
gatekeeper on legal expertise: without his sanction, no expert had the authority to express 
binding legal opinions.84 In the passage above, the emperors mediate the various sources 
of authority. Their expertise consists in eventually choosing whose expertise ought to be 
applied to the case in hand.  
Rather than having the debate about the origin and justification of legal or 
metrological order, nature (physis) vs. culture (nomos), explicitly transferred onto 
himself, then, the emperor emerges as a figure who stands above others. Take the case of 
Maecianus’ fragment on the Rhodian law: because Antoninus Pius is the acknowledged 
master of the universe, he can sanction the application of a legal order, the law of the sea, 
other than the normal one. Again, some legislation introduced by Hadrian and Antoninus 
Pius seems to point in the direction of greater humanity towards women, children 
oppressed by paternal right  (patria potestas) and slaves. This has been seen as a 
reflection of the greater attention they paid to non-Roman laws and customs, which in its 
turn would be the reflection of a lesser role for Rome as a city in the empire and a greater 
awareness of the multiculturalism of the empire. The flip side is, in advocating power of 
interpretation over the law common to all peoples (ius gentium) rather than just over civil 
law (ius civile), the emperor was reaffirming his power over the extended domain of the 
                                                 
83 Cf. Amarelli (1983) 88-9; Scarano Ussani, (1987) 75-6 and note 86, with further references. 
84 Bretone, (1989) 198, 200, 211-3. Bauman (1989) 236-7, 301-2 thinks that part of the story behind 
Hadrian’s emphasis on juridical administration, reform and greater role for the consilium principis is the 
fact that he wanted to weaken the role of the praetor, and through that indirectly of the senate and of the 
senatus consulta. 
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entire world.85 To put it in metrological terms, while acknowledging the existence and 
utility of other standards, the emperor posited himself as the supreme measure, to which 
the others were required to refer in case of conflict or when mediation was needed. The 
process itself by which the emperor became a super-standard can be seen as a kind of 
inscription device that began with Augustus himself. Even at the level of ritual  - through  
his visage on coins, and the presence of his name and the events of his individual life 
within the official calendar - the emperor was originally officially a figurehead for the 
senate and the people of Rome. This link between imperial power and ‘real’ sources of 
authority was gradually erased, until the emperor could stand outside debates on 
rationality, nature or convention because he was not standing in for any further source of 
authority. From a sort of stand-in he became the ultimate reality of authority. 
From this perspective, the fact that the coinage for the Western part of the Empire 
was in this period and until CE 192 issued from a single centre, the mint of Rome, 
acquires some significance.86 Indeed, in mere economic terms Maecianus implies a 
situation (and this will become more and more the case in late antiquity) where the coin is 
valuable not so much because of its ‘real’ value (gold or silver or bronze), but because it 
is inscribed in a complex trust system, ultimately guaranteed by the state, i.e. the 
                                                 
85 Echoes of some of these issues in Dio Chrysostom, Oratio 15.20 (mid- to late first century AD); 
Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 550b (late first century to early second century AD); Aelius Aristides, 
Ad Romam 102-3 (AD 155). Casavola (1980) 215, 222, 226; Marotta (1988) 73-9; Vander Waerdt (1994); 
Amarelli (1996); De Giovanni (1996); Scarano Ussani (1997). Scarano Ussani (1979) 134, 154-5, 200, 
describes ‘a critical attitude’ towards traditional Roman legal institutions on the part of members of the 
ruling class. 
86 Hobley (1998) 1. Cf. also Cassius Dio, Historia 52.30.9. 
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emperor.87 Or at least it should be. The grounding of order in economics as in law was 
ultimately contested, subject to recalcitrant money-lenders,88 the vicissitudes of history 
and the contingencies of geography. Conflicts ensued which had to be solved: in fact, in 
land-surveying as in law, most of the administration from the late first century CE seems 
to be negotiating disputes on the interpretation of previous land-divisions or previous 
legal decisions.89 It was in order to measure up to alternative sources of expertise or 
authority that Marcus Aurelius had to know about the law, and he had to know about 
money: so that he could afford, like Columella and like the architect described by 
Columella, not to be an expert, and thus supersede jurists and  accountants 
(ratiocinatores) alike.  
 
Conclusion 
Different peoples will have different measures: some Italic populations used a 
ten-unit based system for the as, which was abandoned by the Romans and is mentioned 
by Maecianus as a possible subdivision which is not in use.90 Analogously, land-
surveyors report that different people will measure, count and divide up land 
differently.91 The imperial administration through its officers had to come to terms with 
                                                 
87 Cf. Savio (2001) 21. 
88 P. Oxy. 1411 (AD 260). 
89 Salvius Julianus manifests awareness of a conflict between some imperial decisions and the ratio iuris 
according to Scarano Ussani (1987) 150-2. 
90 See Pedroni (1996), especially 25, 67-8. 
91 Hyginus 1, De condicionibus agrorum 80.9, 92.21-22; Hyginus 1, De generibus controversiarum 98.11-
12; Hyginus 2, Constitutio limitum 138.1-28 (Campbell). 
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this diversity by finding either a unified system or a way of managing the diversity while 
partially retaining it. If Frontinus represents an empire where order in the form of 
measures and standards is being formulated, perhaps Maecianus speaks for a situation 
where one can, at best, acquire the knowledge to understand an order which is already in 
place, the result of an ultimately unresolved dialectic between systematising efforts, 
convention, regional variations, different sedimentations of history, and the manifestation 
of disparate interest groups.  
The role of the reader of the Distributio (and the emperor is one of the intended 
readers)92 is not so much to express an order of one’s own, as to grasp and maintain – 
administer - what is already in place. It is an active role, reinforced by the imperatives 
and the ‘constructive’ verbs through which the subdivisions of money are in turn made, 
the names called out, the signs written down, the account given. Yet, it is not a creative 
role. The author is almost resigned to the fact that the world is in a certain way, that 
fringes of deregulation will always be present, that we have the stand-in; in fact, more 
than one system of stand-ins, but we cannot retrieve with certainty the ‘things’ behind 
them and with that, the real cause of the present order(s) of things. The Distributio, like 
many of the legal texts it seems germane to, does not aspire to retrieve the absolute 
foundations; it does not aim to go back to level zero, as it were, but to create a meta-level 
from which the others can be adjudicated and regulated. Sheep, if ever they were the 
‘real’ pecunia, are not important any more: all that counts, and all that effectively exists, 
                                                 
92 Addressing technical books to emperors is not uncommon (see e.g. Vitruvius, Balbus, Pliny Sr.), but that 
to me does not exclude the possibility to take the dedication at face value as well, especially in cases, like 
Maecianus’, where the author was well acquainted with the dedicatee. 
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are stand-ins, pecunia numerata, and it is this reality that one must try to grasp. Marcus 
Aurelius may have craved the well-rounded speech that Greek paideia could provide, but 
Maecianus reminds him of the necessity to know what is appropriate for an emperor. The 
Roman children who learn to divide the as into a hundred parts in Horace’s vignette may 
indeed have been training for higher and more momentous imperial tasks. 
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